N.Y. Penal Law § 15.15: Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements

§ 15.15 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability

requirements.

1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some

element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such

mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the

offense by use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly"

or "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to

defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of

intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a

statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of

the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

2. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a

statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be

required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or

all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct

necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a

crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict

liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental

culpability. This subdivision applies to offenses defined both in and

outside this chapter.