Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 63-1-745.59: Legislative intent - Severability

A. Mindful of Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996), in which

in the context of determining the severability of a state statute

regulating abortion, the Supreme Court of the United States held

that an explicit statement of legislative intent is controlling. It

is the intent of the Legislature that every provision, section,

subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word in this act, and every

application of the provisions in this act to every person, group of

persons, or circumstances, are severable from each other.

B. If any application of any provision in this act to any

person, group of persons, or circumstances is found by a court to be

invalid, preempted, unconstitutional, or to impose an undue burden

on any woman or group of women seeking an abortion, then the

remaining applications of that provision to all other persons and

circumstances shall be severed and preserved, and shall remain in

effect. All constitutionally valid applications of the provisions

in this act, and every application of those provisions that can be

enforced without imposing an undue burden on women seeking

abortions, shall be severed from any applications that a court finds

to be invalid, preempted, unconstitutional, or to impose an undue

burden on women seeking abortions, and the valid applications shall

remain in force, because it is the Legislature's intent and priority

that every valid application be allowed to stand alone. Even if a

reviewing court finds a provision of this act to impose an undue

burden in a large or substantial fraction of relevant cases, the

applications that do not present an undue burden shall be severed

from the remaining applications and shall remain in force, and shall

be treated as if the Legislature had enacted a statute limited to

the persons, group of persons, or circumstances for which the

statute's application does not impose an undue burden.

C. The Legislature further declares that it would have enacted

this act, and each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause,

phrase, or word, and all constitutional applications of the

provisions of this act, irrespective of the fact that any provision,

section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, or

applications of this act were to be declared invalid, preempted,

unconstitutional, or to impose an undue burden.

D. If any provision of this act is found by any court to be

unconstitutionally vague, then the applications of that provision

that do not present constitutional vagueness problems shall be

severed and remain in force, consistent with the severability

requirements of subsections A, B, and C of this section.

E. No court may decline to enforce the severability

requirements of subsections A, B, C, and D of this section on the

ground that severance would "rewrite" the statute or involve the

court in legislative or lawmaking activity. A court that declines

to enforce or enjoins a state official from enforcing a statutory

provision does not rewrite a statute, as the statute continues to

contain the same words as before the court's decision. A judicial

injunction or declaration of unconstitutionality:

1. Is nothing more than an edict prohibiting enforcement that

may subsequently be vacated by a later court if that court has a

different understanding of the requirements of the Oklahoma

Constitution or United States Constitution;

2. Is not a formal amendment of the language in a statute; and

3. Does no more rewrites of a statute than a decision by the

executive not to enforce a duly enacted statute in a limited and

defined set of circumstances.

F. If any state or federal court disregards the severability

requirements of subsections A, B, C, D, and E of this section, and

declares or finds any provision of this act facially

unconstitutional, when there are discrete applications of that

es no more rewrites of a statute than a decision by the

executive not to enforce a duly enacted statute in a limited and

defined set of circumstances.

F. If any state or federal court disregards the severability

requirements of subsections A, B, C, D, and E of this section, and

declares or finds any provision of this act facially

unconstitutional, when there are discrete applications of that

provision that can be enforced against a person, group of persons,

or circumstances without violating federal law, the federal or state

constitutions, or imposing an undue burden on women seeking

abortions, then that provision shall be interpreted, as a matter of

state law, as if the Legislature had enacted a provision limited to

the persons, group of persons, or circumstances for which the

provision's application will not violate federal law, the federal or

state constitutions, or impose an undue burden on women seeking

abortions, and every court shall adopt this saving construction of

that provision until the court ruling that pronounced the provision

facially unconstitutional is vacated or overruled.