N.Y. Penal Law § 125.26: Aggravated murder

§ 125.26 Aggravated murder.

A person is guilty of aggravated murder when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes

the death of such person, or of a third person who was a person

described in subparagraph (i), (ii), (ii-a) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of

this subdivision engaged at the time of the killing in the course of

performing his or her official duties; and

(a) Either:

(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision

thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the

time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her

official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known

that the victim was a police officer; or

(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a

of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or

sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the

criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the

course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew

or reasonably should have known that the victim was such a uniformed

court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the

division for youth; or

(ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical

technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse

involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the

course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and

was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant

knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such

firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,

physician or registered nurse; or

(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional

institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as

defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who

was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his

or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have

known that the victim was an employee of a state correctional

institution or a local correctional facility; and

(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the

commission of the crime; or

2. (a) With intent to cause the death of a person less than fourteen

years old, he or she causes the death of such person, and the defendant

acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of

conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior

to the victim's death. As used in this subdivision, "torture" means the

intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain that is

separate and apart from the pain which otherwise would have been

associated with such cause of death; and

(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the

commission of the crime.

3. In any prosecution under subdivision one or two of this section, it

is an affirmative defense that:

(a) (i) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional

disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the

reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a

person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the

defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall

constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,

aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the first

degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree. (ii) It

shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse" pursuant to

subparagraph (i) of this paragraph when the defendant's conduct resulted

from the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of the victim's sexual

orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression or sex

assigned at birth; or

(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without

the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.

Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a

prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in

the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime

except murder in the second degree.

Aggravated murder is a class A-I felony.