N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27: Murder in the first degree

§ 125.27 Murder in the first degree.

A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the

death of such person or of a third person; and

(a) Either:

(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision

34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of

the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and

the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended

victim was a police officer; or

(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a

of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or

sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the

criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the

course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or

reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a

uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee

of the division for youth; or

(ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical

technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse

involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the

course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and

was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant

knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such

firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,

physician or registered nurse; or

(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional

institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as

defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who

was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his

official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known

that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional

institution or a local correctional facility; or

(iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was

confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody

upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence

commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate

term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of

which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing,

the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving

such a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or

custody; or

(v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior

occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the

intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether

or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended

victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and

the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for

such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family

member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the

killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the

testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate

family member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal

action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of

exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used

in this subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband, wife,

father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent,

stepchild or grandchild; or

(vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the

killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended

victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the

receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or

from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of

a party to such agreement; or

(vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of

committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery,

burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first

degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first

degree, a crime formerly defined in section 130.50 of this title, sexual

abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree

or escape in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of

immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime

or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting

to commit the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however,

the victim is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and,

provided further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under

this subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another

person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to

section 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where

the defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another

pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or

(viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with

intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional

person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;

provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal

transaction; or

(ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted

of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,

or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if

committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such

sections; or

(x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner

pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting

torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this

subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of

extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the

infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing

debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of

pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or

(xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more

additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions

within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar

fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or

(xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision

twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the

defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the

killing, a judge; or

(xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as

defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this

chapter; and

(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the

commission of the crime.

2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative

defense that:

(a) (i) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional

disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the

reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a

person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the

defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall

constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,

manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the

second degree. (ii) It shall not be a "reasonable explanation or excuse"

pursuant to subparagraph (i) of this paragraph when the defendant's

conduct resulted from the discovery, knowledge or disclosure of the

victim's sexual orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, gender

expression or sex assigned at birth; or

(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without

the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide.

Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a

prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second

degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.

Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.